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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONSIDERED
DETERMINATIVE
United States Constitution Amendment V
United States Constitution Article I, §8, cl. 3
United States Constitution Amendment IV
Utah Constitution Article I, §14
Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1986)
Utah Code Annotated §59-19-101 through 107 (1988) (Addendum "A",
Brief of Appellant)
Utah Code Annotated §77-7-15 (1982)

V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent is satisfied with Appellants' statement of
the case,

VI. STATEMENT OP PACTS
Respondent is satisfied with Appellants' statement of
the facts,
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A.

The

Fourth

Amendment

of

the

United

States

Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution
protect

citizens

from unreasonable government

intrusions

into

areas where they have a legitimate expectation of privacy.

The

existence of that legitimate expectation is a threshold issue in
questions of claimed violations of rights.
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In this matter,

neither defendant has met the burden of establishing a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the concealed area of the van where the
controlled

substances

passenger.

were

located.

Towers

was

merely

a

At best, Robinson had permissive use of the van,

which he claimed to have obtained from his employer.

However, he

specifically asserted that his employer had items of personal
property in the concealed area which the employer did not want
disturbed.

Neither defendant

has

standing

to assert

Fourth

Amendment violations.
B. The initial reason advanced by the trooper for the
stop of the vehicle was that it swerved sharply into his lane,
and but for his use of brakes, would have collided with his
patrol

vehicle.

Certainly

under

those

circumstances,

a

reasonable hypothetical officer would have pursued stopping the
defendants' vehicle.
C. Having initiated the traffic stop, the two troopers
on the scene continued to make observations leading to reasonable
articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, apart
from

the

moving

traffic

violation.

They

pursued

their

investigation with diligence and in the least intrusive fashion,
until their suspicions were confirmed and they achieved probable
cause to arrest.
D. During the course of their investigation at the
scene,

they

requested

consent
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from

Robinson

to

search

the

vehicle, and
narcotics

later specifically requested

canine

to

the

the

scene.

officers'

consent to bring a

Robinson

request,

asked

following

questions

pertaining

to

which

he

consented.

The totality of the circumstances as contained in the

record of the proceedings below demonstrates that the consent was
voluntarily given.
E.

With

regard

to

the

challenge

to

the

constitutionality of the Illegal Drug Tax Stamp Act, it would be
contrary

to

the

purposes

of

the

Commerce

protection to those trafficking in controlled

Clause

to

give

substances, and

contrary to public policy, since it would mean fostering free
trade in drugs.
F. Marijuana cannot be construed to be a legitimate
article of interstate commerce, since its manufacture and sale
have never been subject to licensing, nor revenue taxation, nor
any other express regulations.

Its mere possession is illegal.

G. Though Appellants argue that the Act violates Fifth
Amendment protections
compulsion

for

one

against self-incrimination, there is no
purchasing

the

tax

stamps

incriminatory information, not even identification.

to

provide

There is no

requirement whatsoever for any information which would provide a
significant link in the chain of evidence tending to establish
guilt.
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H. The Act is not void for vagueness as Appellants
urge.

The terms of the Act provide explicit instruction as to

when the tax is due and payable, what constitutes a "dealer"
subject to the Act, and that the stamps are to be affixed to the
substances.

VIII. ARGUMENT
A
NEITHER DEFENDANT HAD A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY,
THEREFORE NEITHER HAS STANDING TO ASSERT VIOLATION OF THE
RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION OR UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
"protects people from unreasonable government

intrusions into

their legitimate expectations of privacy." U. S. v. Chadwick,
U.S. 1, at page 7 (1977).
protection.

433

Article I, Section 14 offers similar

However, the threshold issue which must be resolved

is whether either of the defendants, Towers or Robinson, had any
legitimate expectation of privacy in the compartment in the van
wherein the controlled substances were located.
In Rakaa v.
States

Supreme

legitimate
property

Illinois,

Court

expectation

or possessory

439 U.S. 128 (1978), the United

determined

that

in

order

of privacy, one must
interest

assert

have

a

either a

in the vehicle, and

particular area of the vehicle searched:
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to

in the

But here petitioner's claim is one which
would fail even in an analogous situation in
a dwelling place, since they have made no
showing
that they had any
legitimate
expectation
of
privacy
in
the
glove
compartment or area under the seat of the
car in which they were merely passengers.
Like the trunk of an automobile, these are
areas in which a passenger simply would not
normally have a legitimate expectation of
privacy, Rakas, at pp. 148-149.
In the case at bar, Towers was merely a passenger.
Robinson claimed to have the permission of the owner of the
vehicle to be in possession of it; however, he did not have or
assert any personal legitimate expectation of privacy in the area
of the compartment where the controlled substances were located.
To

the

contrary, he

stated

that

his

boss

had

his

personal

belongings under there which the employer did not want disturbed.
The

Rakas

Supreme Court.

reasoning

In State

v.

has

Dealo,

been

adopted

by

the

Utah

748 P.2d 1985 (Utah, 1987),

the defendant, a passenger in a vehicle (as Towers herein) took
his turn driving.

The other passenger in the vehicle claimed to

have the permission of the owner of the vehicle
herein).

After a

traffic

stop,

and

based

(as Robinson

upon

information

obtained during the ensuing detention, the execution of a search
warrant

revealed

several packages

compartment in the vehicle.

of

cocaine

in a

concealed

The Utah court relied upon Rakas in

its analysis, and concluded that the defendant therein "presented
no evidence establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy in
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the area where the cocaine was found.

Therefore, he had no

standing to object to the search..." Dealo,

p. 197.

To allow defendants in the instant case to assert a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the compartment of the van
would be allowing them to assert the rights of a third party.
That has been specifically denied:
Fourth Amendment rights [and,
the
State
would urge, rights
under Article
I,
Section
14, of the Utah Constitution]
are personal
rights
which,
like
some
other
constitutional
rights,
may
not
be
vicariously asserted.
Alderman v.
U.S.,
194 U.S. 165, 174 (1969), cited with
approval in Rakas, supra, at pages 133-134.
[Bracketed material supplied]

B
THE INITIAL STOP OF THE VEHICLE WAS VALID BASED UPON
THE TROOPER'S OBSERVATION OF THE TRAFFIC VIOLATION
It is well-established that in the absence of clear
error, an appellate court will uphold a trial judge's factual
assessment underlying a decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress evidence.

State v.

Ct.App., 1988); State

v. Mendoza,

State

v. Ashe,

Sierra,

754 P. 2d 972,974

(Utah

748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah, 1987);

745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah, 1987); State

743 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah, 1987), cert. den.

U.S.

v.

Branch,
, 108

S.Ct. 1597, 99 L.Ed.2d 911 (1988).
As part of its Findings of Fact in connection with both
the hearing on the Motion to Suppress and the Motion to Dismiss,
-7-

which

Findings

are

a part

of

this

record,

the

trial

court

specifically found that defendants' vehicle abruptly swerved into
the trooper's

lane

of

travel, causing

a near

collision

and

requiring the trooper to slam on his brakes to avoid same.
In Appellants' brief, the argument pertaining to the
trial

court's

decision

concerning

the Motion

to Suppress

is

largely devoted to urging this court to adopt defendants' view of
what they consider to be plausible and conceivable facts and
conduct.

However, they do not take issue with

the

factual

finding of the trial court, nor do they urge that there has been
any clear error.
Absent any demonstrable

clear error, the underlying

factual assessment must be upheld.

The argument that the conduct

of defendants' vehicle did not justify a reasonable officer in
stopping

the vehicle

is unpersuasive.

A near

collision

averted only by the quick response of Trooper Garcia.
be doubted

that a reasonable officer would

was

It cannot

have stopped the

vehicle.

C
THE DETENTION OF DEFENDANTS WAS REASONABLE AND LIMITED
TO THE TIME NECESSARY TO EFFECTUATE THE PURPOSE OF THE STOP AND
TO DISPEL THE OFFICER'S SUSPICIONS REGARDING OTHER CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY
The trial court specifically found that from initiation
of the traffic stop to arrest, the detention lasted thirty-eight
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minutes.

Here again, defendants urge the appellate court to make

a different factual finding without any showing of clear error on
the part of the trial court.

They argue that the troopers

"consistently tried to obtain consent to search an area of the
van to which the defendants flatly denied access over a period of
forty minutes" (Appellants' Brief, page 26). However, this bald
assertion is flatly unsupported by the record.
To the contrary, the record reveals that after the van
was

pulled

over,

there

was

substantial

conversation

with

defendants concerning the ownership and registration of the van,
including attempts by Trooper Garcia to verify permissive use
with the California owner through dispatch.

Trooper Garcia

discussed with the driver the reason for the stop and issued a
warning

citation.

During

this

period

of

time, there

were

observations made by the troopers which gave rise to articulable
suspicions of criminal activity apart from the original traffic
violation.

These included the observation of marijuana seeds in

the rear area of the vehicle.

Additionally, part of the time was

consumed by the fact that once the narcotics canine was summoned,
it took some time for the canine officer to respond from the Salt
Lake

International

Airport.

Once

the

canine

alerted,

the

defendants were placed under arrest and a search warrant obtained
before the van was searched further.

-9-

The detention was clearly reasonable

in length and

reasonably related to the purpose of the stop and to dispel the
officers' reasonable articulable suspicions which arose once they
had the opportunity to make further observations of the vehicle
and its occupants.

The officers diligently pursued means of

investigation which were least intrusive.

D
THE CONSENT OP ROBINSON WAS KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY GIVEN
In Schneckloth

v.

Bustamonte,

412 U.S. 218 (1973), the

United State Supreme Court distinguished consent to search from
out-of-court admissions and confessions, and indicated that a
warning of right to refuse consent was not necessary, "for it
would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent
search the detailed requirements of an effective warning."

While

a suspect's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be
taken

into

account,

"the

prosecution

is

not

required

to

demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a
voluntary consent."
In determining whether consent was voluntarily given
the Court

should

consider

surrounding the search.

the totality

of

the

circumstances

Some things the Court should consider

are the individual's ability to understand the circumstances, the
coercive or non-coercive atmosphere, whether the individual had
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been placed under arrest, and whether the individual's will was
overborne by the conduct of the officer•
In the instant case, the record of proceedings in the
trial court, together with the preliminary hearing transcript
admitted by stipulation of the parties, reveal no difficulty on
the part of Robinson in understanding what was being asked of
him.

Indeed, he even asked Trooper Ogden for clarification and

was given same.

There is no factual basis from which it can be

assumed

that the atmosphere was coercive.

Trooper

Ogden

demonstrated

that

he

"shot

The testimony by
the

breeze"

Robinson about fishing and picking up girls in bars.

with

Although

the vehicle was being detained, defendants had not been placed
under arrest.

The conduct of the officers demonstrated a choice

of resolving the situation through the least intrusive means.
Once the canine alerted, a search warrant was obtained before the
vehicle was more thoroughly searched.
The totality of the circumstances as established by the
record

demonstrated

that

Robinson's

given.

-11-

consent

was

voluntarily

E
GRANTING COMMERCE CLAUSE PROTECTION TO THE POSSESSION
AND/OR SALE OF MARIJUANA IS COUNTER TO THE PURPOSES OF
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY
In

urging

the

Court

to

dismiss

Count

II

of

the

Information in the above-captioned matter, which involves the
offense of Unlawful Possession of Marijuana Without Tax Stamps
Affixed, Defendants argue that the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act is
violative

of

the

Commerce

Clause

Constitution, Article I, Section 8.
to include marijuana

of

the

United

States

However, Defendants' attempt

as a legitimate article of commerce is

misdirected, as is evident from the fact that giving Commerce
Clause protection to marijuana and other controlled substances
runs counter to the stated purposes of Article I, Section 8.
The primary and underlying purposes of the Commerce
Clause are:
(1) To foster free trade among the states
[Cf. H.P. Hood and Sons,

Inc.

v.

Dumond,

336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949)];
(2) To prevent interstate trade wars
[Cf. Hood, supra, at 539]; and,
(3) To prevent states from favoring local
interests [Cf. McGoldrick
Coal Mining

v.

Berwlnd-White

Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45-46 (1940)].

-12-

Free trade among the states means "that every farmer
and craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty
that he will have free access to every market in the Nation ..."
Hood,

supra, at page 539.

Bringing marijuana within Commerce

Clause protection means, "...every marijuana grower or dealer or
trafficker shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that
he will have free access to every market in the Nation...".

Such

a result is clearly outside of the intent of our Founding Fathers
and contrary to public policy.
To

prevent

interstate

trade

wars

means

"...every

consumer may look to free competition from every producing area
in the Nation, to protect him from exploitation by any.

Such was

the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this
Court which has given it reality."
Bringing

marijuana

within

Commerce

Hood,

supra, at page 539.

Clause

protection

means

"...every marijuana user may look to free competition as between
all growers/dealers/traffickers
from exploitation by any...".

in the Nation, to protect him
Certainly such a result was not

the vision of the Founders or the doctrine of any court which has
been called upon to consider the use and possession of marijuana
or other controlled substances.
A final purpose
states

from favoring

of Article I, Section 8 is to prevent

local interests.

This means taxes are

condemned if used to place interstate commerce at a competitive

-13-

disadvantage.

Since out-of-state residents have no access to the

state political process, they are thought to be particularly
vulnerable and in need of Commerce Clause protection.
Bringing marijuana within Commerce Clause protection
means placing

all marijuana growers or dealers or traffickers on

equal footing and ensuring that out-of-state growers or dealers
or traffickers will not be put at an economic disadvantage when
competing against instate growers, dealers and traffickers.

This

tortured pseudological reasoning is clearly outside the purposes
of Article x, section 8.
When viewed against the historical backdrop of Commerce
Clause purposes, as defined by the above-stated authorities, it
is clear that Defendants' attempt to extend these protections to
those

who

grow,

deal

or

traffick

controlled substances should fail.

in

marijuana

or

other

Such a result was not within

the contemplation of the Founding Fathers or any court since
called upon to interpret the Commerce Clause, and it is against
public policy.

F
MARIJUANA IS NOT A LEGITIMATE ARTICLE OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE

In Austin
States

Supreme

v.

Court

articles of commerce.

Tennessee,
held

179 U.S. 343 (1900), the United

that

cigarettes

were

legitimate

The Court stated its reasons as follows:
-14-

Congress, too, has recognized tobacco in
its various forms as a legitimate article
of commerce by requiring licenses to be
taken
for its manufacture and sale,
imposing a revenue tax upon each package of
cigarettes put upon the market, and bymaking
express
regulations
for
their
manufacture and sale, their exportation and
importation...Austin at p.
The Court went on to state that we cannot hold that any
article which

Congress recognizes

in so many ways
(Austin,

legitimate article of commerce."

is not a

supra, at page 345,

empha sis added).
The question

then arises whether Congress has ever

recognized marijuana or other controlled substances as legitimate
article of commerce by:
(1) Requiring licenses to be taken for manufacture and
sale to the general public;
(2) Imposing revenue taxes upon each quantity put upon
the market; or
(3) Making express regulations for manufacture and sale
to the general public, or for exportation and importation.
The answer is quite clear.
whatsoever

to

give

even

the

Congress has done nothing

appearance

or

suggestion

legitimacy to marijuana or any other controlled substance.
the

contrary,

penalties

for

Congress

continuously

possession

and

distribute.

-15-

enhances

possession

the

with

of

Quite

criminal

intent

to

Defendants conveniently overlook the blatant fact that
the

activity

of

possessing

marijuana

or

other

controlled

substances in and of itself illegal, as is transporting such
substances.

On page 32 of Appellants; Brief They describe their

activity simply as "Kim Robinson and Francis Towers were merely
transporting a substance

through Utah.*.".

(Brief of Appellants,

page 32, emphasis added)
In summary, the conduct of possessing and transporting
marijuana or other controlled substances does not come within the
protection of the Commerce Clause because:
(1) It is outside the purpose for which the Article I,
Section 8 was created and intended; and
(2) Marijuana is not a legitimate article of interstate
commerce.

G
THE ILLEGAL DRUG TAX STAMP ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Defendants

argue

that

their

Fifth

Amendment

right

against self-incrimination is violated by the Illegal Drug Tax
Stamp Act because:
(1) The purchase of the stamp itself is an admission of
illegal activity; and/or
(2)
indicate

Displaying

knowledge

that

the

stamps

you

are

-16-

on

the

possessing

marijuana
marijuana

will
and

therefore is a "link in a chain of evidence tending to establish
guilt."
The United States Supreme Court has established a test
to determine whether or not a tax statute violates the Fifth
Amendment

right

against

self-incrimination,

penalties for noncompliance unenforceable.

and

thus

makes

The test consists of

three elements:
(1) Whether the tax is in an area permeated with penal
laws and therefore directed towards a select group inherently
suspected of criminal activities;
(2) Whether, in order to comply with the tax one is
compelled

to

provide

information

which

he

might

reasonably

suppose to be available to prosecuting authorities; and,
(3) Whether the compelled information is such as would
surely prove a significant link in the chain of evidence tending
to establish guilt.

If any one of the three elements is missing

there is no Fifth Amendment violation.
U.S. 6 (1969); Marchetti

v.

U.S.,

Cf. Leary

v.

U.S.,

395

390 U.S. 39 (1968).

In this case the second and third elements are wholly
lacking.

Under the Illegal Drug Tax Stamp Act, the taxpayer is

not compelled to give any information whatsoever, other than the
quantity

of

stamps

desired

to

be

purchased.

There

registration form or tax return that must be submitted.
anonymity is afforded purchasers.
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is

no

Complete

The only requirements are that

the tax amount be paid, and thereafter that the tax stamps be
affixed to the controlled substance.
Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

Cf. Section 59-19-105, Utah

Therefore, the taxpayer cannot

reasonably suppose that compelled information will be available
to prosecuting authorities or that compelled

information will

surely prove a significant link in the chain of evidence tending
to establish guilt.
Defendants further argue that the act of purchasing
stamps at the Tax Commission or otherwise obtaining them is an
admission of illegal activity, and therefore, an act of selfincrimination.

However, the taxpayer is not required to appear

at the Tax Commission nor is anyone else required to appear.
only requirement is that the tax be paid.

The

The stamps can be

mailed to any address including a mail drop or private mailbox
company.

The stamps can be picked up by messenger service, cab

company or any individual.
many

of

these

incriminatory
appearance.

steps

as

information,

A taxpayer can combine a series of as
he

desires,

not

even

and
as

need
to

supply

his

no

physical

Therefore, he is not compelled to make any type of

admission that could even remotely be characterized

as self-

incriminatory.
In addition, the third element is lacking because there
is no compelled

information which would prove a

"significant

link" in the chain of evidence tending to establish guilt.
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The

stamp itself says nothing of who did the purchasing or affixing.
As already noted, information as to who actually purchased the
stamp or affixed it is outside the statutory requirements.
The United States Supreme Court has plainly stated that
fanciful or trifling hazards of self-incrimination such as those
conjured

up

by

Defendants

do

not

rise

to

constitutional

significance:
The central standard for the privilege's
application has been whether the claimant
is confronted by substantial
and real,
and

not merely

trifling

or Imaginary,

hazards

of incrimination.
Marchettl
v.
United
States,
390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968), emphasis
added, citations omitted.
The Illegal Drug Tax Stamp Act does not impinge Defendants' Fifth
Amendment rights.

H
SECTION 59-19-101 et seq., UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED
COMPORTS WITH SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Defendants' final argument is that the statute is too
vague for an individual to understand what conduct is prohibited
and

is

so vague that law enforcement will be arbitrary and

discriminatory.

Defendants advance the following syllogism to

support their view:
(1) Kim Robinson and Francis Towers had no directions
as to where to place the stamps;
(2) The arresting officers could not know where to look
-19-

for the stamps; and
(3) Therefore, the opportunity for abuse and illegal
arrests is flagrant, and the law invalid.
As stated in Roberts
page

357

(1983),

"...enable

a

v.

statute

individuals

to

U.S.

Jaycees,

defining
conform

461 U.S. 352, at

criminal
their

conduct

conduct

to

must
the

requirements of the law..." and not be so vague that "...persons
of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application."
Defendants'
statute is not vague.

argument

is

without

merit

because

the

The tax is "due and payable immediately

upon acquisition" or "possession" of "marijuana" or a "controlled
substance" by a "dealer."
Annotated 1953, as amended.

Cf. Section 59-19-105(2), Utah Code
The terms "marijuana," "controlled

substance" and "dealer" are specifically defined.

To evidence

payment of the tax the dealer is required to immediately affix
the tax stamp to the substance.

No dealer may possess any

marijuana or controlled substance on which tax is imposed unless
the tax has been paid as evidenced by a stamp.

If a dealer does

possess such drugs without payment of the tax and affixment of
the stamp, there is a 100% penalty in addition to the tax.
Defendants' questions as to where the stamps are to be
placed, or how the officers are going to know where to look for
the stamps are plainly answered by the statute:
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you place the

stamps on the marijuana or controlled substance.

The officers

look on the marijuana or controlled substance:
When
a
dealer
purchases,
acquires,
transports, or imports into the state
marijuana or controlled substances, he
shall
permanently
affix
the
official
indicia on the marijuana or controlled
substances evidencing the payment of the
tax required under this chapter. No stamp
or other official indicia may be used more
than once.
§59-19-105(1), Utah Code
Annotated.
X. CONCLUSION
Based upon the argument and authorities presented, and
upon the record, Respondent seeks affirmance of the decision of
the trial court with regard to the Motion to Suppress and the
Motion to Dismiss, and the affirmance of the convictions of both
defendants.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Utah Attorney General
WENDY HUENAGEL
WILLIAM/J. ALBRIGHT /~
Special Asst. Attys^: General
By:
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